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I.   INTRODUCTION
The medical profession has segregated society into disparate
groups including physicians, non-physician providers, health insur-
ers, malpractice liability insurers, regulatory boards, attorneys, and
patient-consumers. Each plays a distinct role, yet all are expected to
assimilate into a manageable, profitable, and productive health care
system. However, today’s society seems unwilling to continue to ac-
cept the notion that doctor knows best, and that the patient is subor-
dinate to the provider.1 Consumers are demanding more information
about physicians,2 expansion of their legally protected rights,3 and
greater involvement in their own health care decisions.4
                                                                                                                   
* The author thanks her mother, June, for her patience, support, and guidance.
The author would also like to thank Ralph Artigliere, Tom Surgent, and those who con-
tributed to the editing and publication of this Comment.
1. See Robert S. Adler, Stalking the Rogue Physician: An Analysis of the Health Care
Quality Improvement Act, 28 AM. BUS. L.J. 683, 741 (1991) (“Society has reached a point
where citizens no longer view the medical profession with an uncritical eye and unques-
tioning faith.”); Esekiel J. Emanuel & Linda L. Emanuel, Preserving Community in Health
Care, 22 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 147, 148 (1997) (“No longer given free rein, physicians
and hospitals are being asked to provide information and to justify their practices.”).
2. See State Increases Access to Physician Data, 23 HEALTH LEGIS. & REG. WKLY.
(Apr. 9, 1997), available in 1997 WL 8740264 [hereinafter State Increases Access]. Con-
sumer-driven legislation has led to the disclosure of various types of information. In Illi-
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With Massachusetts leading the way, several state legislatures
are responding to consumer dissatisfaction by enacting bills aimed at
increasing consumer access to physician-specific information in pro-
file format.5 Certainly, accurate information in comprehensible form
would facilitate consumer comparison of physicians and allow pa-
tients to better assess treatment options. The weakness with much of
the proposed, or even enacted, legislation is the erroneous impression
that the data disclosed will adequately inform a consumer about a
given physician. Misleading information is worse than no informa-
tion.6 In noble efforts to make physician data more consumer-
friendly, several state legislatures have taken significant liberties
with previously compiled physician information already in the public
                                                                                                                   
nois, a bill would require telephone hotlines to provide information about criminal convic-
tions, disciplinary action, and license restrictions. See id. In Delaware, a bill would allow
the Board of Medicine to subpoena previously privileged peer review and quality review re-
cords to enhance consumer complaint investigations. See id. Maryland previously prepared
reports in response to written consumer requests that include information on all claims
against a given physician, whether a payment was made or not. See id. However, physi-
cians objected to legislation that would have allowed the public to obtain this information
on the Internet. This legislation was shelved and an agreement was reached between phy-
sicians and the Maryland Medical Association that “only final adjudicated malpractice
data” should be provided to consumers. Id.; see also Mass. Consumers Gain Access to MD
Data, 13 MED. MALPRACTICE L. & STRATEGY 1 (1996) [hereinafter Consumer Access]
(“[S]igns point toward more health care information being put in the hands of the public . .
. [it is] ‘an inexorable trend across the country.’” (quoting David B. Nash, Director of
Health Policy and Clinical Outcomes at Thomas Jefferson University Hospital in Philadel-
phia)).
3. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11131-11151 (Supp. 1995) (requiring certain entities to report
malpractice disciplinary action and obligating hospitals to obtain such information); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 5 (1996) (requiring physicians to report biographical information for
a physician profile, and requiring the Board to investigate complaints, hold hearings, take
disciplinary action when appropriate, and establish a risk management unit to prevent fu-
ture claims);  FLA. STAT. § 455.5651 (1997) (requiring physicians to provide biographical
information, including any criminal offenses or final disciplinary action against them, and
requiring the Department of Health to compile information and submit it to the public);
Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 480 (1990) (holding that the plaintiff
stated a cause of action against his physician, as well as others, for their failure to disclose
their personal interest, unrelated to plaintiff’s health, in using plaintiff’s cells in poten-
tially lucrative medical research); Hidding v. Williams, 578 So. 2d 1192, 1198 (La. Ct. App.
1991) (holding a physician liable for malpractice for failing to obtain informed consent from
the patient before surgery by failing to educate the patient on the risks associated with the
procedure as well as the physician’s alcohol abuse).
4. See discussion infra Part IV; see generally Emanuel & Emanuel, supra note 1;
Hidding, 578 So. 2d at 1198 (holding that the patient had a right to know about the physi-
cian’s alcohol abuse when deciding whether to have surgery).
5. See State Increases Access, supra note 2 (explaining that Florida, Delaware,
Maryland, Vermont, Connecticut, California, Massachusetts, and New York all have pro-
consumer laws in effect or under consideration).
6. See infra notes 174-78 and accompanying text (discussing the Entman study and
its findings).
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record by selectively publishing the information in formats that are
not comprehensive.7
Accountability, informed consent, fiduciary duty, and basic supply
and demand theory have been cited by various consumer advocates
as reasons for the swell of disclosure-oriented legislation.8 This
Comment begins by exploring the interrelationship of provider-
specific disclosure and these doctrines. Part II focuses on informed
consent and patient autonomy, harm to the consumer by the disclo-
sure of inaccurate or incomprehensive information, procedure specific
data disclosure, and fiduciary obligations. Part III discusses holding
physician’s accountable through the complexities of government dis-
closure of provider-specific information. Part IV explores the risks
and benefits associated with the disclosure requirement in Massa-
chusetts. Studies and laws from other states, in particular Florida,
are used in analyzing the Massachusetts law. Part V reveals the an-
ticipated cost of the disclosure legislation enacted in Florida. Finally,
this Comment concludes that consumers have a valid interest in be-
ing fully informed about those treating them, but that current disclo-
sure schemes are inadequate to inform consumers because of the le-
gal and medical complexities involved.
II.   THE INFORMED CONSENT RUBRIC
The medical field follows a doctrine unique in its existence, but
hardly unique in its purpose. The doctrine of informed consent pro-
vides that valid patient-consumer consent to medical treatment re-
quires that the patient-consumer be informed of all material infor-
mation related to such care.9 Traditionally, this has meant that
health care providers must disclose the potential risks, benefits, side
effects, details of treatment, and anticipated results involved with a
particular treatment.10
                                                                                                                   
7. See Frances H. Miller, Illuminating Patient Choice: Releasing Physician-Specific
Data to the Public, 8 LOY. CONSUMER L. REP. 125, 125 (1996).
8. See generally Mary Anne Bobinski, Autonomy and Privacy: Protecting Patients
From Their Physicians, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 291 (1994); Emanuel & Emanuel, supra note 1,
at 148; Mark Fajfar, An Economic Analysis of Informed Consent to Medical Care, 80 GEO.
L.J. 1941 (1992); Miller, supra note 7, at 125-26; Douglas Sharrott, Note, Provider-Specific
Quality-of-Care Data: A Proposal for Limited Mandatory Disclosure, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 85
(1992).
9. See Fajfar, supra note 8, at 1941. In Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (Kan.
1960), the Kansas Supreme Court launched the trend in treating failure to obtain consent
to treatment as negligence. The court held that a physician must provide a patient with
sufficient information to allow the patient to understand the treatment prior to consent to
such treatment. See id.; see also Fajfar supra note 8, at 1943.
10. See Hidding v. Williams, 578 So. 2d 1192, 1194 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that a
physician is required to provide the patient with enough information to allow the patient to
make an informed and intelligent decision about submitting to a proposed course of treat-
ment); Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P. 2d 479, 483 (1990) (stating that when
obtaining informed consent, “a physician has a fiduciary duty to disclose all information
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Some commentators argue that informed consent should extend
beyond a doctor’s mandatory disclosure of treatment information to
include disclosure of provider-specific data.11 Precisely what type of
provider-specific data should be disclosed to patients to enhance in-
formed consent is a tricky question. Some commentators argue for
the release of outcome data,12 while others believe that a patient is
entitled to personal information about their doctor.13 Advances in
computer and communication technology further encourage the re-
lease of and increased access to various types of data on physicians
and treatments.14
This section explores the relationship between informed consent,
the recent trend toward the disclosure of provider-specific data, and
potential problems that may arise. For example, patient autonomy,
while potentially increased by disclosure, could easily be jeopardized
if public disclosure is deemed to satisfy consent requirements. The
burden would then be shifted away from the physician historically
charged with providing information, and onto the patient to seek
data that is in the public record. Moreover, a physician’s privacy
rights could be compromised if consumer advocates succeed in their
efforts to know all, no matter how unrelated the information may be
to the administration of health care. All of these potential problems
stem from the erroneous premise that the more a consumer knows,
the more valid consent to treatment will be.15
                                                                                                                   
material to the patient’s decision”); Fajfar, supra note 8, at 1943 (arguing that treating pa-
tients without their consent violates the physician’s fiduciary duty to patients and that pa-
tients have the “right to informed self-determination”); Miller, supra note 7, at 125 (stating
that some would argue that the “informed consent doctrine should not be extended beyond
a patient’s right to information about the risks and benefits of recommended therapy”);
Sharrott, supra note 8, at 85-87 (stating that physicians must respect patient autonomy in
making decisions regarding the patient’s course of medical treatment by providing the pa-
tient with enough information to make an informed decision).
11. See Miller, supra note 7, at 125; Sharrott, supra note 8, at 86-88.
12. See Sharrott, supra note 8, at 87-91. Outcome data can be analyzed in two ways.
First, the information can analyze and compare a physician’s or hospital’s services to the
specific characteristics of the patient. Second, the information can analyze the “appropri-
ateness of a given treatment to determine whether a particular procedure or diagnosis is
overutilized or unnecessary.” Id. at 87 n.6.
13. See Miller, supra note 7, at 125 (stating that patients choose a physician because
of price and competence and because price is a diminishing factor with the growth of the
managed care system, competence “constitutes the only other basis on which patients can
make decisions about providers and treatment”).
14. See Brian Kibble-Smith & Arthur W. Hafner, The Effect of the Information Age on
Physicians’ Professional Liability, 36 DEPAUL L. REV. 69, 80-85 (1986) (discussing on-line
information relating to medical treatment); Sharrott, supra note 8, at 86-87 (discussing on-
line information relating to physician and hospital care).
15. See infra section II.C (discussing the balance between physician privacy and pa-
tient autonomy).
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A.   The Autonomy Justification
Patient autonomy is the cornerstone of informed consent.16 The
basic premise is that patients lack the specific medical knowledge
necessary to assess treatment options. To alleviate the knowledge
disparity between the patient and physician, the patient should re-
ceive all pertinent information to ensure that the choice to undergo
the contemplated medical treatment is one the patient would make if
all potential outcomes were known.17 Unlike other services or prod-
ucts for which a consumer can exercise informed, independent judg-
ment when deciding whether to make the purchase or not, the “pur-
chase” of medical services is one frequently made on blind faith in
the provider chosen. Patient ignorance of the qualifications of those
providing medical care undermines personal autonomy by exacer-
bating the imbalance of power between the physician and the pa-
tient.18 Thus, any decision to pursue medical treatment or therapy is
uninformed to the extent that the patient does not know personal in-
formation which could affect a physician’s ability to perform the
medical services contemplated. In this scenario, alcohol or substance
abuse problems, criminal convictions, and prior malpractice claims or
prior bad outcomes not resulting in any legal action would theoreti-
cally be useful information for a patient considering medical treat-
ment. The flaw in weighing heavily this type of information is that it
can be misinterpreted or misunderstood in many of the forms in
which it is currently available.19 The translation of reality into print
can often fall short in terms of accuracy and usefulness.
Those who advocate for the release of personal provider informa-
tion as a means of ensuring patient-consumer autonomy cite in-
creased provider competition and the radical changes in the health
care system resulting from managed care as a justification for arm-
ing the patient-consumer with enhanced physician data.20 No longer
is it deemed sufficient for a patient to be told solely about the treat-
                                                                                                                   
16. Former New York Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Cardozo penned the premise
of informed consent: “Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to de-
termine what shall be done with his own body.” Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospi-
tal, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (holding that lack of patient consent to surgery results in
the intentional tort of battery); see also Fajfar, supra note 8, at 1943.
17. See Fajfar, supra note 8, at 1943; Miller, supra note 7, at 125; Sharrott, supra note
8, at 120.
18. See Bobinski, supra note 8, at 292; see also Miller, supra note 7, at 125 (arguing
that consumer ignorance significantly “contributes to a patient’s inability to evaluate
medical judgment”).
19. See Sharrott, supra note 8, at 119-20 (citing Mark V. Pauly, The Public Policy Im-
plications of Using Outcome Statistics, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 35 (1992)).
20. See Miller, supra note 7, at 125 (citing Anthony Szczygiel, Beyond Informed Con-
sent, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 171 (1994)).
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ment. The individual administering the treatment is also an indis-
pensable variable in the risk-benefit analysis.21
B.   Autonomy and Economics
Supply and demand theory suggests that providing specific infor-
mation could increase competition among providers, thereby in-
creasing consumer choice and eventually raising the standards for
health care providers.22 The key to the competition justification, how-
ever, is that the patient-consumer must have the ability to shop for a
provider.23 In reality, managed health care alters the delivery of
health care to such an extent that the patient is not the one who
“shops” for a provider; the real health care consumer is often the in-
surer who creates a health care package that the patient ultimately
purchases.24 Problematically, choices among insurers are decreasing
as employers limit the insurance available to their employees.25
Thus, because the patient falls out of the provider-consumer loop, in-
surance companies are the entities that must evaluate the providers
with whom they contract.26
Presuming, however, that a patient-consumer participates in a
health plan where some provider choice remains, two variables affect
competition in any market—price and quality.27 Consumers typically
buy the product or utilize the service when price and quality fall
within a certain agreeable range.28 In the typical fee-for-service
health care regime, those who can pay the most receive the best care,
and those who cannot pay as much frequently sacrifice quality. As
managed care becomes more and more prevalent, the gap in avail-
able care will likely narrow, and patient-consumers will likely worry
                                                                                                                   
21. See Hidding v. Williams, 578 So. 2d 1192, 1194 (La. Ct. App. 1991); Moore v. Re-
gents of the Univ. of Calif., 793 P. 2d 479, 483 (1990); Miller, supra note 7, at 125; Shar-
rott, supra note 8, at 141.
22. See Emanuel & Emanuel, supra note 1, at 156. Emanuel & Emanuel have devel-
oped an economic model of accountability in which patients are consumers who shop for
health care seeking a satisfactory combination of price and quality, and care providers are
“economic producers trying to sell their services as the best product for the lowest price.”
Id. The interaction will induce the care providers “to maintain or even enhance quality.”
Id.
23. See Robin Elizabeth Margolis, Dentists and Physicians Wiggling Out of National
Practitioners’ Data Bank?, 10 HEALTHSPAN 25, 25 (1993).
24. See Emanuel & Emanuel, supra note 1, at 156.
25. See id. at 166; Marc A. Rodwin, Managed Care and Consumer Protection: What
Are the Issues?, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 1007, 1018 (1996) (pointing out that although
many consumers prefer traditional insurance to managed care, “employers and third-party
payers often do not offer it or make it affordable”).
26. See Rodwin, supra note 25, at 1014 (arguing that this may lead to “shoddy treat-
ment” by the managed care organization).
27. See Emanuel & Emanuel, supra note 1, at 156; see also Miller, supra note 7, at
126.
28. See Miller, supra note 7, at 126.
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less about how much a provider’s services cost because they will re-
ceive services as long as they pay their insurers’ monthly premi-
ums.29 Insurers will bear the burden of contracting with the best
physicians, and physicians will be compromised by the need to con-
tract with insurers to maintain patient pools.30
The patients’ ability to assess the quality of the physicians that
contract with their insurers, however, will continue.31 As a result,
any deficiency in the provider information will impair a patient’s
ability to make an informed choice about the physicians available
within any given health plan.32 But if the supply and demand theory
is a real component in the evolving health care delivery system, as
some analysts believe, insurer competition and physician competition
should weed out physicians that consumers presumably do not want,
and the remaining “stable” of physicians should all be desirable pro-
viders.33 Thus, the appreciable difference among providers should
diminish, and the value of provider-specific data should also decline.
C.   Physician Privacy v. Patient Autonomy: The Delicate Ba lance
In opposition to the patient-consumer interest in personal pro-
vider information is the privacy interest of the physician.34 The very
fact that individual profiles of all physicians licensed in the United
States are maintained by the federal government, but have not been
accessible to the public at large for the past decade, suggests that
valid reasons exist for controlling the amount and form of informa-
tion the public receives about providers.35 Much of the information
                                                                                                                   
29. See id.
30. See Emanuel & Emanuel, supra note 1, at 156.
31. See Miller, supra note 7, at 126.
32. See Sharrott, supra note 8, at 122 (citing usefulness of “timely, accurate, under-
standable and well-presented” provider-specific outcome data as a means of making more
informed provider and treatment decisions).
33. See id. at n.22. Sharrott notes that:
Provider-specific data may also be used to detect and identify low-quality pro-
vider performance. From this the number of low quality providers may be re-
duced by the following methods: (1) the providers may modify and correct their
procedures, practices, and skills so that their performance is enhanced to ac-
ceptable levels; (2) if uncorrectable, the provider’s license to practice the proce-
dure in question may be revoked; or (3) the low-quality provider is driven out of
business by market forces.
Id. at 124 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). See John D. Butler, GM’s View on Purchas-
ing High-Quality Providers, 61 HOSP. 90 (1987) (“In the old market of few providers and
minimal competition, most providers could be confident of their survival. In the new mar-
ket, no such assurances exist.”).
34. See Bobinski, supra note 8, at 291.
35. See Stephen S. Entman et al., The Relationship Between Malpractice Claims His-
tory and Subsequent Obstetric Care, 272 JAMA 1588, 1591 (1994); see also Fitzhugh Mul-
lan et al., The National Practitioner Data Bank: Report From the First Year, 268 JAMA 73,
78-79 (1992).
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that is becoming available as the result of state legislation36 is al-
ready public information available to curious patients.37 However,
the information that is available may be difficult for the lay person to
discover38 and thus some consumer advocates believe government
compilation is not only beneficial but also necessary for enhancing
the regulation of the medical profession.39 A problem arises, however,
when information is summarized or reduced to statistics; brevity
then gives way to accuracy.
For example, in the April 1997 Florida Report on Physician Disci-
pline and Malpractice, the Agency for Health Care Administration
disclosed select information about closed medical malpractice
claims.40 Though the preface for the information, in chart form, ex-
plains that a malpractice suit or payment of a malpractice claim
“does not necessarily mean a doctor is unsafe,”41 the chart categorizes
injuries into nine levels of severity.42 The chart also designates the
point in the legal process at which the claim was resolved.43 Though a
useful means of summarizing the information, the explanation of the
designations chosen is less than exact. For instance, under the ex-
planation of the “stage legal” classifications, the Florida Health Care
Report reads:
STAGE LEGAL[:] Indicates at what point in the legal process the
claim was resolved. Most medical malpractice claims settle before
going to trial. If a claim is settled for nuisance value, this is proba-
bly more likely to happen early in the process, since this is when
the insurer can save the most money in defense costs. Of course
some significant cases settle early when the malpractice liability is
very clear and the defendant and the insurer have little likelihood
of successfully defending the suit. The later in the legal process the
                                                                                                                   
36. See supra note 2 and accompanying text; see also FLA. STAT. § 455.247 (1997);
Miller, supra note 7, at 126 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 5 (1997)).
37. See Consumer Access, supra note 2, at 1 (citing Mass. HB 5662 (1996) as providing
data “that routinely is not available such as out-of-court settlements or the names of physi-
cians whose hospital privileges have been revoked or restricted”). Though Massachusetts
provides final decisions of hospital disciplinary bodies, pre-decision proceedings are confi-
dential. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, §§ 111, 204 (1997).
38. Much of the information is made public through court files, administrative hear-
ings, and perhaps even licensing records. The average consumer may not have the general
knowledge of the various agencies and courts to know where to look for the information or
may not have ability to locate the data once there. Searching jury verdicts and court rec-
ords can be a daunting task for someone unfamiliar with the legal system. Undoubtedly,
other agency records would be equally as challenging to search for useful information.
39. See Miller, supra note 7, at 135.
40. See AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMIN., FLORIDA REPORT ON PHYSICIAN
DISCIPLINE AND MALPRACTICE 167-90 (1997) [hereinafter FLORIDA HEALTH CARE REPORT]
(stating that closed medical malpractice claims constitute claims that have been resolved
either in court or through a settlement).
41. Id. at 167.
42. See id. at 170.
43. See id.
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claim is settled, the more likely that the issues of fact or the law
were closely contested.44
One can only guess what the average reader could draw from this
explanation. An individual with a good grasp of the legal system or
the insurance industry may understand that the point at which a
case settles or closes may have little, if any, correlation to the merits
of the case—especially in a state like Florida where medical malprac-
tice insurers can settle claims without the consent of their clients.45 A
lay person may assume that the earlier the resolution, the worse the
case must have been.46 An astute reader of the Florida Health Care
Report may, however, recognize that the stage level may be a useful
indicator of how particular insurers handle claims, but not at all in-
formative as to the potential level of care available.47
One school of thought takes the position that the mere existence
of malpractice claims is a valuable indication of the quality of the
doctor-patient relationship, and thus his ability to care for patients.48
The correlation of prior claims with subsequent claims and changes
in care has been the focus of several empirical studies.49 Studies fo-
cusing on Florida physicians indicate “that even a single malpractice
claim has predictive value as a harbinger of subsequent claims”50 and
thus would more fully inform the patient-consumer seeking a physi-
cian for future treatment. The researchers performing the Florida
study concluded that previous claims, regardless of whether they re-
sulted in a payment or not, were indicative of physicians with trou-
bled relationships with their patients.51 If these studies are accurate
                                                                                                                   
44. Id. at 169.
45. See Scott S. Thomas, An Insurer’s Right to Settle Versus Its Duty to Defend Non-
meritorious Medical Malpractice Claims, 16 J. LEGAL MED. 545, 550-55 (1995).
46. This is a real danger despite the language in the report indicating that both nui-
sance claims and significant claims often are settled early in the legal process. See
FLORIDA HEALTH CARE REPORT, supra note 40, at 169-70.
47. For example, according to the report one physician faced three malpractice claims,
each resulting from a death (severity code nine) and each resolved at legal stage four
(“more than 90 days after suit filed and prior to or during the course of mandatory settle-
ment”). The insurance policy limit was $1 million. In 1991 the first claim was resolved for
$30,000, in April 1994 another claim was resolved for $1 million, and in September 1995
the final claim was resolved for $25,000. See FLORIDA HEALTH CARE REPORT, supra note
40, at 171. With identical outcomes and resolutions at the same stage, there is no way to
determine the reason for the discrepancy in the indemnification. One might question the
usefulness of this information, or at least this format, if the ultimate goal is to enhance a
patient’s knowledge about a particular physician so that the patient can make a more in-
formed physician choice. In its current form, the only fact that a reader can determine is
the amount of insurance this particular physician carries.
48. See Randall R. Bovjberg & Kenneth R. Petronis, The Relationship Between Physi-
cians’ Malpractice Claims History and Later Claims: Does the Past Predict the Future?, 272
JAMA 1421, 1425 (1994); Entman, supra note 35.
49. See Miller, supra note 7, at 127; see also Bovjberg & Petronis, supra note 48, at
1430.
50. Miller, supra note 7, at 127.
51. See Bovjberg & Petronis, supra note 48, at 1425.
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in assessing the value of knowing prior claims, the question remains
how much a consumer needs to know about the claim. It would ap-
pear that consumers would benefit from simply knowing of a previ-
ously filed case against a physician if prior claims are true indicators
that a particular physician has poor interpersonal communication
skills that affect quality of care.52 However, simply revealing that a
physician has had a claim filed against him or her does not mean
that the claim was meritorious or that there was any malpractice.
D.   Disclosure—The Nonfinancial Costs
Disclosure of prior claims is accompanied by significant costs such
as unjust harm to the physician’s reputation and consumer misreli-
ance.53 Inaccurate or complex data does not enhance consent, it
merely muddies the waters of consumer choice. For example, the
consumer who receives data revealing a prior malpractice claim filed
against a given physician could accept that information as indicative
of a low-quality provider. If, however, the claim never progressed
past filing because it had no merit, the information could easily tar-
nish the physician’s reputation. The consumer could be harmed in
this scenario by possibly disregarding a provider who may be the best
in the field, thereby compromising the quality of the treatment re-
ceived, or by choosing another provider who is incompetent but has
escaped claims for whatever reason. Though some commentators
strongly disagree that harm to a physician’s reputation and con-
sumer misreliance are justifiable reasons for stifling provider-specific
data,54 it is essential to recognize that informed consent is only facili-
                                                                                                                   
52. Emphasis should, however, remain on quality of care rather than merely incom-
patible personas that lead to the filing of claims. See Entman, supra note 35, at 1588 (not-
ing that the relationship between previously filed claims and future substandard care may
be valuable, but warning that “if the frequently sued physician does not practice substan-
dard medicine, but has, for example, poor interpersonal skills that promote claims, then
the deterrent effect of the tort system may be targeting physicians because of their person-
alities and not the technical care they provide” (citations omitted)).
53. See Sharrott, supra note 8, at 126-31.
54. See id. (discounting the threat of unjust reputational harm by arguing: (1) that
the only harm of “incorrect” provider choice based on publicly disclosed data is an economic
loss that does not warrant a continued nondisclosure policy; (2) that physicians concerned
with data complexity should contribute to making the data easier to comprehend rather
than complaining of reputational harm that may be caused by inexact information; (3) that
output data does not need to be complex, but rather can be simplified to provide a compari-
son of providers to the “average” or a ranking that is within the comprehension of the gen-
eral public; and (4) that the very idea of withholding information is paternalistic and is
contrary to public policy favoring government disclosure).
Sharrott admits that risk factors adversely affect the accuracy of provider statistics, but
concludes that:
the data will always indicate that some providers are worse or better than they
actually are, and in this sense, will always be unfair, either to the physician or
the consumer. But is there a superior alternative? The haphazard qualitative
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tated by the compilation and disclosure of accurate and comprehen-
sive information.55
E.   Procedure Specific Data Disclosure
Another dimension of the informed consent issues associated with
physician-specific information is the disclosure of procedure-specific
data. Those who encourage access to such information claim proce-
dure- or treatment-specific data will allow patients to assess the
quality of care of a given physician (or even a facility) and also allow
a consumer to determine whether a physician has sufficient experi-
ence with a specific treatment.56 For instance, in the early 1990s the
New York State Department of Health published a unique ranking of
New York physicians based on open-heart-surgery-related mortality
rates.57 The rankings were reportedly risk-adjusted to more ade-
quately rank the surgeons.58 By reporting the number of surgeries
performed, and the corresponding mortality rate, a patient-consumer
could determine whether a particular physician performed a suffi-
cient number of procedures with acceptable outcomes.59
The accuracy of such risk-adjusted statistics poses the most sig-
nificant concern. The baseline problem with the medical profession,
as well as the legal profession, is that the variables that must be cal-
culated when providing treatment are infinite—as are the outcomes.
If physicians face the possibility of being published and compared in
rankings whenever they accept patients, there is a real risk that the
rankings will result in greater defensive medicine and a decrease in
the number of physicians willing to pioneer new techniques or to ac-
cept high-risk patients.60 Outcome-specific provider data will only
enhance informed consent if those who have the information are able
                                                                                                                   
methods now used by patients to select providers are just as unfair to both phy-
sicians and patients.
Id. at 130 (citations omitted).
55. Sharrott suggests that providers who are subject to a reasonableness standard in
terms of preventing harm to their patients caused by medical malpractice should not de-
mand perfection but merely reasonably accurate provider data. See id. This argument has
limited appeal, especially to the physician who suffers a loss due to poor data representa-
tions.
56. See id. at 89.
57. See id.
58. See id. at nn.10-11. Risk adjustment theoretically permits physicians performing
similar procedures to be compared equally by factoring out patient pre-treatment condi-
tions such as degree of sickness or age. See id.
59. See id. at 88.
60. See id. at 94 (“There may be an increase in defensive medicine by providers, tak-
ing the form of an increased reluctance by providers to treat high-risk patients.” (citing
Joyce A. Lanning & Stephen J. O’Connor, The Health Care Quality Quagmire: Some Sign-
posts, 35 HOSP. & HEALTH SERVICES ADMIN. 39 (1990), and “criticizing HCFA’s attempt to
provide consumers with a provider performance ‘scorecard’ since its punitive approach is
more likely to result in greater defensive medicine and not better health outcomes”)).
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to rely on the data to make better choices. If the data fails to accu-
rately account for severity and risk, or is statistically skewed, the
rankings may misrepresent that one physician is “better” than an-
other. The value of the data to the consumer would then be out-
weighed by the physician’s privacy interests and the community’s in-
terest in preserving the health care options available.
F.   Fiduciary Obligations
The degree to which a physician has a legal obligation to disclose
information has been addressed by various courts across the nation.
In Moore v. Regents of the University of California ,61 the California
Supreme Court treated a physician’s failure to adequately disclose
information as a breach of fiduciary duty, giving rise to the patient’s
legal right to receive at least some personal information about his
treating physician.62 One year later, in Hidding v. Williams ,63 a Lou-
isiana appellate court expanded that state’s Uniform Consent Stat-
ute64 to include liability when a physician failed to disclose his
chronic alcoholism.65 The unifying theme in these decisions is that
the physician has a fiduciary duty to reveal anything that could af-
fect a patient’s decision about treatment. Though Moore and Hidding
deal with the disclosure of information about conditions that may se-
verely affect the judgment of the treating physicians, requiring a
more extensive, “blanketing” form of disclosure as a legal duty has
inherent flaws. The fact that the standard for informed consent var-
ies from state to state demonstrates the most essential problem—
there is no clear consensus. Who should decide what information will
truly increase patient autonomy, and what information will infringe
on a physician’s privacy rights (or possibly hindering much needed
treatment for the patient) remains highly debatable.
In Moore, the patient received treatment for hairy-cell leukemia.66
The bodily fluids that were removed from the patient’s body during
the course of his treatment had significant financial value as re-
search material and ultimately as a cell-line created from the pa-
tient’s T-lymphocytes.67 The court concluded that the patient had a
legally protected interest in being informed about his treatment
which the physician violated by failing to disclose the “extent of his
research and economic interests in Moore’s cells before obtaining
consent to the medical procedures by which the cells were ex-
                                                                                                                   
61. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
62. See id. at 483.
63. 578 So. 2d 1192 (La. Ct. App. 1991).
64. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1299.40 (West 1997).
65. See Hidding, 578 So. 2d at 1196-97.
66. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 480.
67. See id. at 481.
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tracted.”68 After finding that informed consent extended beyond the
disclosure of medical risks to include the failure to reveal a personal
interest in the outcome, the court continued, “‘The scope of the physi-
cian’s communication to the patient must be measured by the pa-
tient’s need, and that need is whatever information is material to the
decision.’”69 The rationale of the court focused on a patient’s right to
be free of concerns that a physician’s judgment or skill could be
clouded by economic interests or incentives.70 Thus, the standard for
disclosure in California requires a physician to disclose any health-
related or extraneous interests that a reasonable patient would want
to know prior to consenting to treatment.71
If a physician truly has a fiduciary duty to reveal all information
that may be material to the patient, the current swell of disclosure
legislation and the accompanying expenditures necessary to imple-
ment such programs raise additional questions. The first is whether
states must necessarily become involved if physicians already have a
duty to disclose.72 Second, if state agencies compile and publish in-
formation, does that constitute notice sufficient to relieve a physician
of the duty to disclose?73 If so, a real possibility exists that patients
will be even less informed because not everyone will access the public
information available.
A comparison of the Hidding case and legislation recently enacted
in Florida provides a good example of this conundrum.74 In Hidding,
a patient brought a malpractice action alleging that the physician
failed to completely explain the risk of loss entailed in “loss of func-
tion of body organs.”75 The court stated that the law of Louisiana re-
quired a physician “to advise a patient of any material consequence
that would influence the decision of a reasonable person in the pa-
tient’s condition.”76 The physician failed to disclose his chronic alco-
hol abuse, which the court determined vitiated the consent given by
the patient “[b]ecause this condition create[d] a material risk associ-
ated with the surgeon’s ability to perform, which if disclosed would
have obliged the patient to have elected another course of treat-
ment.”77 Subsequently, the Louisiana State Board of Medical Exam-
                                                                                                                   
68. Id. at 480.
69. Id. at 483 (quoting Cobbs v. Grang, 502 P.2d 1, 11 (Cal. 1972)).
70. See id. at 480.
71. See id. at 497.
72. See generally id. (discussing physicians’ fiduciary duty and the duty to disclose);
Hidding v. Williams, 578 So. 2d 1192 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (discussing same).
73. See Sharrott, supra note 8, at 94 (suggesting that publishing data in the public re-
cord could satisfy disclosure requirements in the scope of informed consent).
74. See Hidding, 578 So. 2d at 1192; FLA. STAT. § 455.565-.5651 (1997).
75. Hidding, 578 So. 2d at 1196.
76. Id. at 1195 (emphasis added).
77. Id. at 1196; see also Emanuel & Emanuel, supra note 1, at 158.
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iners suspended the physician’s license for reasons related to his al-
coholism.78
In 1997 Florida Senator Ginny Brown-Waite79 introduced legisla-
tion to make information regarding physicians more accessible to
health care consumers in a profile form by 1999.80 The Brown-Waite
Act does not require a physician, like the physician in Hidding, to re-
veal his or her alcoholism unless a criminal conviction or a discipli-
nary action related to the addiction had occurred.81 The question is
whether the legislation’s exclusion of alcohol or drug dependency re-
flects on the materiality of that information. If the Legislature ex-
cluded the information because it is not considered valuable in a con-
sumer’s assessment of a potential physician, then is it logical for a
court to impose a duty upon the physician to reveal such an addiction
in the scope of informed consent? The omission of information relat-
ing to substance abuse or other character traits that have the poten-
tial to affect a physician’s judgment may give those reading the phy-
sician profile a false sense of security. On the other hand, absent any
criminal or disciplinary history, no foundation exists for concluding
that such abuses are necessarily a threat to patients.
If informed consent is the justification for publishing physician
profiles, the lines distinguishing a physician’s fiduciary-like obliga-
tions to disclose material information, and the extent to which publi-
cation is sufficient notice for consent, need to be clarified. If a physi-
cian already has a legal duty to disclose, the investment of additional
time and resources to compile already public information into a more
manageable format for consumers may be a poor appropriation of
public funds—the proverbial fleecing of taxpayers.
III.   ACCOUNTABILITY DOCTRINES
Informed consent is a legal mechanism that regulates physician
behavior and makes doctors more accountable. Civil litigation, how-
ever, is not the only method for enforcing standards of care and en-
suring that physicians abide by the social rules and scientific
boundaries recognized by the general populous and the medical
community. Any consumer can initiate a complaint against a physi-
cian, commencing an investigatory process into the alleged deviant
behavior by filing a complaint with the Agency for Health Care Ad-
ministration.82 At times this may be the most effective means of
holding physicians accountable; however, one recent evaluation of
                                                                                                                   
78. See Hidding, 578 So. 2d at 1196-97.
79. Repub., Brooksville.
80. See Fla. CS for SB 648 (1997) (codified at FLA. STAT. § 455.565-.5651 (1997)).
81. See id.
82. “Deviant” may mean the physician deviated from acceptable standards or is devi-
ant in terms of misconduct.
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the complaint process in Florida suggests that professional pater-
nalism in the peer review process, combined with the internal ad-
ministration of professional discipline, disadvantages the consumer
who is forced to rely upon state agencies and boards to hold physi-
cians accountable.83 Thus, holding physicians accountable through
means other than civil litigation may be achieved through increasing
consumer access to physician information.
Some in the medical community believe that as managed care
plans flood the health care scene, the present standard for account-
ability will be significantly altered.84 For example, some believe that
the professional model,85 in which physicians self-regulate through
their professional organizations and review boards, will be usurped
by a model in which medical care is considered a commodity and pa-
tients are the consumers.86 Viable alternatives to the professional
model of accountability are the economic model87 and the political
model.88 Accurate physician profiles are most effective in the eco-
nomic model; consumers can then express their discontent by
changing providers as a means of optimizing cost and quality.89 In
the political model, accountability is accomplished by consumer
“voice votes” in public forums.90 As medicine becomes more of a mar-
                                                                                                                   
83. Critics of the Board of Medicine peer review panels suggest that the Board is more
interested in preserving its medical fraternity than ensuring the quality of care adminis-
tered by the state’s physicians. See Alan Judd, Disciplining Doctors: Board Seems Inclined
to Defend Physicians, LAKELAND LEDGER, July 6, 1997, at A1.
84. See Emanuel & Emanuel, supra note 1, at 147. Accountability is the process by
which a party justifies its actions and policies. Components of accountability include par-
ties being held or holding others accountable, assessing domains and content areas, and
procedures of evaluation. See id.
85. See id. at 152-53. In the professional model, health care is considered a profes-
sional service where, “Because the physician is primarily dedicated to the patient’s well-
being, the patient can be a trusting recipient of the physician’s care, rather than a wary
consumer in the marketplace.” Id. at 153. Accountability in this model focuses primarily on
physician competence and legal and ethical conduct. See id.
86. See id. at 156.
87. See id. In the economic model, “patients should be viewed as consumers who are
shopping among managed care organizations for what they perceive to be the best combi-
nation of price and quality that satisfies their preferences . . . . [H]ealth care is properly
viewed as a commodity; it is subject to supply and demand based upon price and perceived
quality.” Id.; see also discussion infra Part IV.
88. See Emmanuel & Emmanuel, supra note 1, at 158. In the political model, health
care is a community service rather than a market commodity. Patients and physicians are
part of the health system, as opposed to the economic model where patients are consumers
and physicians are essentially the goods. See id.
89. See id.
90. See id. (citing A. HIRSCHIMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO
DECLINES IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (Harvard Univ. Press 1970)); Rodwin,
supra note 25, at 1013-14.
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ket good, physician profiles could become the equivalent of nutri-
tional labels for doctors.91
Accountability as a justification for the publication of provider-
specific information emphasizes an aspect of disclosure that both cor-
relates with and contradicts the informed consent rationale. The two
doctrines correlate to the extent that making information available to
the public makes physician conduct and character more visible.
However, publication as a means of increasing the accountability of
providers, as well as managed care plans, relies on the patient-
consumer actively seeking information and then processing and re-
lying on that data to make choices about providers and plans. Only if
the patient-consumer uses the data to choose the providers that de-
liver the best quality of care for the best price, will providers then be-
come accountable for the conduct that may be reflected in a physician
profile.
For example, in the traditional model—the professional model—of
accountability, physicians go about their business and, for the most
part, only have to answer to their peers or a discontented patient
that files a claim in court.92 As recent exposés on peer review boards
suggest, consumers are increasingly skeptical of intra-professional
standards for accountability.93 Presently, a lay perception exists that
                                                                                                                   
91. The weakness of this analogy is in the idea that data could simply be printed out,
like a nutrition label, and the health care customer would know what he or she was buying
in a physician. See Emanuel & Emanuel, supra note 1, at 168.
92. See id. at 151-52. For a general discussion of consumer fraud legislation as an-
other means of redressing grievances against health care providers, see Lee Ann Bundren,
State Consumer Fraud Legislation Applied to the Health Care Industry, 16 J. LEGAL MED.
133 (1995).
93. See Judd, supra note 83, at A1.
“The Board of Medicine has operated for a number of years within a professional co-
coon,” said Doug Cook, director of the state Agency for Health Care Administration,
which prosecutes cases before the board. “We’ve tried to bring more aggressive con-
sumer representation, and we’ve begun to sensitize the board.” But he said: “In
many cases, it is the ‘distinguished professional’ versus the aggrieved consumer.
And it is the ‘distinguished professional’ who prevails.”
The three-part exposé by Alan Judd was accompanied by a reader’s poll that discusses
the skepticism of the average consumer as well as the potentially irrational reliance a con-
sumer may place on accessible data that could be misinterpreted. The poll posed this ques-
tion: “Do you think patients should have access to records of investigations or complaints
against doctors?” Of 40 respondents, 95% said yes and 5% said no. The responses speak for
themselves:
Yes, the American Medical Association is a corrupt organization . . . Yes, they
say that only doctors can bury their mistakes . . . Yes, the doctor has my life in
his hands . . . Yes, doctors have been killing patients for way too long. It is
about time someone watches these people . . . Yes, doctors always protect their
own . . . Yes, there are way too many incompetent doctors that are only moti-
vated by greed . . . Yes, doctors think they are God. Nay, complaints that have
resulted in disciplinary action should be open to the public . . . Yes, and we
should have a better balanced committee. This committee of all doctors is ri-
diculous . . . Yes, the medical industry is protecting killers . . . Yes, the patient
should know a physician’s professional history. The patient pays for quality
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peer review is shrouded in secrecy94 which enables the physicians to
escape accountability at a cost to the consumer who must rely on the
profession to regulate itself.95
Contrasting with the professional model is the economic model. In
the economic model, consumers are purchasers who use physician
profiles to comparison shop for providers. Relying on basic supply
and demand theory, the physicians with the most desirable cost and
quality will be chosen most often by consumers. Those that are se-
lected less will be forced to either clean up their acts, if the profiles
reveal criminal or disciplinary problems, or attempt to increase their
quality of care, if malpractice claims are the reason they are slighted
by the health care consumer.
Theoretically, all health care providers could become more ac-
countable in terms of training and continuing involvement in health
care advancements if health care consumers rely on and shop based
upon the data regarding education and publication.96 For instance,
knowledge that a particular physician was foreign-educated rather
than educated in the United States or educated in the specific state
in which the patient seeks a provider could affect a patient’s confi-
dence in the type or quality of care that the physician provides. Phy-
sicians may feel the pressure to obtain the most prestigious educa-
tion or to become more involved in research and publications if it be-
comes evident that this type of information has an impact on physi-
cian choice.
While increased emphasis on educational pursuits and continuing
contribution to medical developments could increase accountability,
                                                                                                                   
care and should know, without a doubt, that it will be received . . . No, where
does freedom end and slander begin? . . . No, patients, like members of the
press, are not capable of determining both sides of the story. They can not
make a proper assessment of a physician’s actions.
Alan Judd, Disciplining Doctors: Accused Doctors Continue to Practice, LAKELAND LEDGER,
July 8, 1997, at B1.
94. See Kathleen L. Blaner, Physician, Heal Thyself: Because the Cure, the Health
Care Quality Improvement Act, May Be Worse Than the Disease, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 1073,
1076 (1988) (referring to the Health Care Quality Improvement Act as Congress’s attempt
to “end this ‘brotherhood of silence’”).
95. The data used to support this premise, in criticizing both the legal and medical
professions, are based on the action or discipline ultimately administered in response to
consumer complaints. For example, one legal reform group claimed that for the year 1988,
less than 2% of the more than 70,000 complaints levied against attorneys resulted in pub-
lic discipline, 90% were dismissed, and 8% resulted in non-public action. Similarly in Cali-
fornia in 1986, 8574 attorney complaints were received. Of those, only 192 attorneys had
formal charges against them, and only 185 eventually received sanction. See Linda Morton,
Finding a Suitable Lawyer: Why Consumers Can’t Always Get What They Want and What
the Legal Profession Should Do About It, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 283, 305-06 (1992). Like-
wise, in 1996 the Florida Board of Medicine received 8000 complaints about physicians but
ultimately punished only 191. The Board dismissed 90% of the cases it reviewed (only 1800
of the 8000 were reviewed; the remainder were presumably dismissed for a complete lack
of reviewable conduct.) See Judd, supra note 83, at A1.
96. See Miller, supra note 7, at 128-29.
974 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:957
this pressure could compromise commitment to actual practice,
thereby reducing quality of care and constricting the pool of accessi-
ble providers. In terms of accountability, this is a negative conse-
quence of increased disclosure if consumers inaccurately equate cer-
tain education or research contributions with the quality of care
available from a given provider.
The linchpin to increased accountability resulting from physician
profiles is the accuracy and understanding of the information.97 Un-
doubtedly, some of the biographical data proposed in legislation such
as Florida’s Brown-Waite Act speaks for itself.98 Disciplinary action99
and information relating to liability actions or criminal convictions
could easily fall prey to misinterpretation. Profiles as accountability
tools will backfire if the information provided is not carefully pre-
sented to the consumers.
                                                                                                                   
97. See Emanuel & Emanuel, supra note 1, at 151; Miller, supra note 7, at 130; Rod-
win, supra note 25, at 1018; Sharrott, supra note 8, at 92-93.
98. See FLA. STAT. § 455.565-5651 (1997). Information such as the name of the physi-
cian’s medical school and the date of graduation is easily interpreted. Currently, Florida
requires practitioners to furnish the following biographical data: the name of each medical
school that the applicant for licensure has attended, including the dates of attendance and
the date of graduation as well as a description of all graduate medical education completed
by the applicant; the name of each hospital at which the applicant has privileges; the ad-
dress at which the applicant will primarily conduct his or her practice; any certification the
applicant has received from a specialty board; the first year the practitioner practiced; cur-
rent appointments to medical school faculty and any responsibility for graduate medical
training in the previous 10 years; any criminal offense for which there was a finding of
guilt whether adjudication was withheld or not (including any offense to which there was a
guilty or nolo contendere plea—all crimes that would be a felony or a misdemeanor in
Florida); and any final disciplinary action taken within the previous 10 years by the
agency regulating the profession that the applicant has been licensed to practice (including
resignation from or renewal of medical staff membership or the restriction of privileges at
a licensed hospital, health maintenance organization, prepaid health clinic, ambulatory
surgical center, or nursing home) taken in lieu of or in settlement of a pending disciplinary
case related to competence or character. See id.
     Comparatively, Massachusetts requires disclosure of the following biographical data:
name; office phone numbers(s) and address(es); the nature of the practice (group practice,
solo practice, hospital staff); the number of years in practice; medical license status; pre-
medical and medical schools, including the years attended and the degrees awarded; post-
graduate training; specialty; American Specialty Board certification, recertification, and
eligibility for certification; current employment, including faculty appointments; health
care facilities where the physician holds privileges; plans in which the physician is a pro-
vider; referred journal articles and book chapters; honors and awards; board or hospital
disciplinary findings; criminal convictions; and malpractice summary (compared with norm
for specialty). See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 5 (1997); see also Miller, supra note 7, at
Appendix.
99. See Blaner, supra note 94, at 1095-96. Blaner argues that a report filed with the
National Practitioners Data Bank:
destroys a physician’s right to be presumed innocent . . . . [I]t will blemish the
physician’s professional reputation as long as the information remains in the
data bank. Because the Act requires all facilities at which a physician practices
to check the data bank routinely, a physician has little hope that the medical
community will forget a mistake the physician made early in his or her career.
Id. (citations omitted).
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Much of the data contained in the existing and proposed profiles is
already public information that can be attained through consumer
research. While such research may be tedious and challenging for the
average consumer, it is least likely to be misinterpreted in its origi-
nal context. For instance, court files can be viewed by anyone re-
questing access, and transcriptions of disciplinary hearings are
available upon request.100 Consumers have the opportunity to read
the facts and decide for themselves whether the physician is one from
whom they wish to seek care. At a minimum, profiles that do abbre-
viate practitioner data on claims, discipline, and convictions should
provide links and references to sources of more detailed information.
IV.   MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICES
As of November 1996, consumers can retrieve the profiles of up to
ten Massachusetts physicians per call on a toll-free phone line.101 The
impetus of the Massachusetts data bank was a 1994 media revela-
tion of reported “extreme physician negligence and malfeasance”102
that had been handled too leniently by the hospitals and licensing
authorities charged with regulating the medical profession. Re-
sponding to public skepticism that physician self-regulation results
in patient-consumer concerns yielding to physician interests, the
Massachusetts Secretary of Consumer Affairs appointed an Advisory
Committee on Public Disclosure of Physician Information.103
The Committee’s inquiry had two premises: first, that all reliable
information in the Board of Registration in Medicine’s possession
helpful to the public in choosing doctors should be released, unless a
compelling public policy reason exists for keeping it confidential; and
second, that “[j]udgments and other dispositions regarding a physi-
cian’s competency which result from adversarial or due process pro-
ceedings, provide reasonably reliable information.”104 The Committee
concluded that four types of information should be compiled in a con-
sumer-comprehensible format and made easily accessible: factual
practitioner data, medical malpractice claims history, licensing board
and hospital disciplinary actions, and criminal convictions.105 The
means of dissemination included the above-noted toll-free request
                                                                                                                   
100. See FLORIDA HEALTH CARE REPORT, supra note 40, at inside front cover.
101. See State Increases Access, supra note 2.
102. Id.
103. See Miller, supra note 7, at 127. The Committee’s objective was to determine what
and in what form data in possession of the Board of Registration in Medicine would tend to
equalize the patient-physician relationship, increase accountability, and allow patient-
consumers to make more informed choices about their health care.
104. Id. (citing MASSACHUSETTS ADVISORY COMM. ON PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF
PHYSICIAN INFO., FINAL REPORT (1995)) [hereinafter MASSACHUSETTS REPORT].
105. See MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 112, § 5 (1997); see also Miller, supra note 7, at 127.
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line,106 posting the information on the Internet107 and publication on
CD-ROM to be maintained in public libraries.108
The bill initially proposed in the Massachusetts legislature called
for the release of “‘raw outcomes data,’ including all complaints no
matter how resolved.”109 After passing through both houses, the Gov-
ernor vetoed the bill.110 Although its initial response was adamant
opposition to the release of provider data,111 the Legislature’s ease in
passing the early version of the profile bill, the strength of the con-
sumer skepticism of the medical profession, led to the medical com-
munity tempering its opposition and sponsoring its own compromise
bill.112 This compromise bill was enacted into law.113
A.   Factual Practitioner Data
The first category of information contained in the profiles is bio-
graphical data that a physician can supplement with information on
“publications, awards and other honors, training and specialty certi-
fication and length of practice.”114 The education and medical train-
ing information consists of “basic ‘positive’ factual information about
physician competency.”115 The Committee recognized that physicians
often display diplomas and specialty and training certificates; how-
ever, limited consumer access to such information does not facilitate
easy comparison.116 As a means of enhancing patient autonomy, the
                                                                                                                   
106. See State Increases Access, supra note 2 (“An initial barrage of 700-1000 calls a
day nearly overwhelmed the system; however, by spring, calls leveled off to around 200 per
day. Consumers can request up to 10 physician reports at a time, to be mailed or fac-
simileed the same day.”).
107. See Consumer Access, supra note 2, at 2.
108. See Massachusetts Board of Registration in Medicine (visited April 2, 1998)
<http://www.docboard.org/ma/ma_home.htm>.
109. State Increases Access, supra note 2 (quoting Massachusetts Medical Society
President Joseph Heyman).
110. See id.
111. See Consumer Access, supra note 2, at 2-3.
Naturally, the Massachusetts medical community is critical of the bill. Argu-
ments against it include that malpractice data do not reflect the quality of care,
as physicians who take on higher-risk care will have the highest rates of mal-
practice judgments; that in cases involving HMOs, physicians may not be
named as defendants, while independent practitioners do not have that advan-
tage; that insurers often urge physicians to settle, rather than engage in costly
litigation; and even that erroneous information might inadvertently be pub-
lished.
Id.
112. See Mass. HB 5662 (1996) (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 5 (1997)). Mas-
sachusetts House Bill 5662 was signed into law by Governor William Weld on August 9,
1996. See id.
113. See State Increases Access, supra note 2.
114. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 5(q) (1997); see also Consumer Access, supra note
2, at 3.
115. Miller, supra note 7, at 128-34.
116. See id. at 129.
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Committee recommended that the profiles create a uniform presenta-
tion of such data so consumers can shop for physicians that have the
background they find desirable.117 The other categories of informa-
tion, especially the method of presentation, spawned greater concern
and apprehension in the medical community.118
B.   Medical Malpractice Cla ims History
The original bill included all complaints no matter how resolved.119
The obvious problem with this proposal is that a filed claim defini-
tively indicates little more than the fact that a patient, dissatisfied
for whatever reason,120 was able to find a willing attorney to initiate
litigation.121 Recent studies on the effects of prior claims on quality of
care and malpractice suggest that the mere fact that a plaintiff files
a claim may be indicative of a poor physician-patient relationship.122
As such, there may be some consumer value in knowing whether
prior claims were initiated against a particular provider.123 However,
this value should be carefully balanced against the harm that such
vague reporting of claims could do to the professional reputation of
the physician.124 This concern may be evidenced by the fact that the
Massachusetts law reveals malpractice payments classified in gen-
eral categories of above average, average, and below average without
disclosing the actual amounts paid.125 An accompanying disclaimer
warns consumers that settlements may be unrelated to the issue of
professional competence.126 The profile also provides statistical data
for physicians in the particular field allowing for a comparison be-
tween a given physician and the percentage of those in the same field
who have also paid claims.127
Though restricting the profile data to paid claims history is a vast
improvement on the original profile proposal, there are some inher-
ent problems that remain unresolved by the categorization provided
for in the final bill. For example, replacing dollar amounts with
broad classifications fails to adequately represent the cause of a
claim. Consider two physicians with vastly different insurance policy
                                                                                                                   
117. See id.
118. See State Increases Access, supra note 2; see also Miller, supra note 7, at 127-29.
119. See State Increases Access, supra note 2.
120. Dissatisfied patients include those who have suffered malpractice and have a le-
gitimate claim, as well as those who have suffered no injury but file a claim.
121. See supra note 111 (discussing problems related to malpractice data).
122. See Entman et al., supra note 35, at 1588.
123. See Miller, supra note 7, at 127.
124. See Sharrott, supra note 8, at 126-27 (arguing this could lead to financial loss,
ruined careers, and hospital closings).
125. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 5(f) (1997); see also State Increases Access, supra
note 2.
126. See MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 112, § 5(f) (1997).
127. See State Increases Access, supra note 2.
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limits, doctor one at $1 million and doctor two at $200,000. Doctor
one has a nuisance claim that his insurance company is willing to
settle for $200,000 because the complexity of the claim would result
in litigation costs well in excess of that amount. Plaintiff one accepts
the settlement offer. Doctor two has a claim with clear negligence,
but he is only one of several defendants, and his insurance company
offers to settle for the amount of the policy limit early to avoid incur-
ring the expense of litigation. Plaintiff two accepts, knowing that the
other defendants have some liability as well. Both doctors pay the
same amount; the question is, how they will be classified? They could
both fall into the same category because the amount paid was the
same. They may fall in different categories because the payment in
proportion to the amount of insurance coverage was vastly different
(25% as opposed to 100%). They may also fall into different categories
because the classification is based on the average amounts paid for
certain types of injuries or by certain types of physicians. With so
many possible grounds for determining whether a payment is consid-
ered “average,” it is unlikely that such categorization will provide ac-
curate or truly informative data for consumers. The complexity of
medical malpractice—from the physician-insurer relationship128 to
the actual legal issues—are barely comprehensible to the physicians
themselves, not to mention the general consumer who would be using
naked claims data to make provider choices.
One powerful argument in support of classified disclosure of the
medical malpractice claims can be found in the results of several
studies that reveal only one tenth of medical negligence results in
any claim at all.129 At least one well-known study, analyzing Florida
practices,130 found a significant correlation between past claims and
the likelihood of future claims.131
                                                                                                                   
128. See id. (discussing hidden insurance related issues); see also Thomas, supra note
45, at 583 (discussing the rights of insurers, insured physicians, and the potential tension
that arises when reporting requirements tarnish a physician’s reputation). The article con-
cludes that courts have a responsibility to protect the insurers’ and physicians’ rights while
protecting the rights of the patients-consumers.
129. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 7, at 133.
130. See Bovjberg & Petronis, supra note 48, at 1421.
131. See id.  at 1423; but see Entman et al., supra note 35, at 1588.
Conclusions.-No relationship was found between prior malpractice claims expe-
rience and the technical quality of practice by Florida obstetricians. Strategies
that attempt to identify physicians at risk for future clinical errors by using
data on prior malpractice claims (such as the National Practitioner Data Bank)
may be misjudging the likelihood that substandard clinical care will be pro-
vided by physicians with prior claims.
Id.
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1.   The Bovjberg and Petronis Study
The Bovjberg and Petronis study analyzed the effect of negative
claim history on future decisions by physicians,132 the likelihood of
disciplinary action against physicians with bad claims,133 and the re-
lationship between claims and the actual quality of care given by
physicians with negative claim history.134 The data sources for the
study were the Florida Medical Professional Liability Insurance
Claims file135 and the American Medical Association’s Physician Mas-
terfile.136 The researchers made several conclusions with implications
concerning the accuracy and usefulness of prior claims history, some
of which would support the profiles137 and some of which reveal the
potential flaws of such disclosure.138
As an initial matter, the researchers noted that malpractice
claims on the whole are “relatively rare in the life of a physician,
even in Florida, a very litigious state.”139 Of the 8247 physicians in-
cluded in the study 59.2% faced non-consequential claims (that is,
where the claimant never made a demand for payment or the insurer
never expended funds for investigation or litigation) during the nine-
year focus period for the study.140 Of the remaining physicians, 13.4%
had a single paid claim,141 7.2% had multiple paid claims, and 20.2%
faced no claims at all.142 Physicians facing no claims, as opposed to
non-consequential claims, declined during the study period causing
the researchers to speculate that either incident reporting increased
in accuracy or patients became more litigious.143 The litigiousness
conclusion was cited as the best explanation for another finding—a
rise in the number of claims per physician, per year.144
                                                                                                                   
132. See Bovjberg & Petronis, supra note 48, at 1421.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 1422. The Florida Medical Professional Liability Insurance Claims file is
a state-maintained archive with information on all medical liability claims closed in Flor-
ida. This file is the compilation of data submitted, by law, by all Florida insurers and self-
insurers concerning all claims filed, regardless of whether any payment was demanded or
paid. The file, however, excludes physicians who have had no claims filed against them.
See id.
136. This file contains “descriptive and demographic information about all physicians”
and includes data on physicians without a claims history. Id.
137. See id. at 1425.
138. See id. at 1421.
139. Id. at 1424.
140. See id. The study examined claims from 1975-1983.
141. See id. at 1425.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See id. A physician-year is a full calendar year in which a physician practices and
is exposed to potential claims of malpractice.
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Though Massachusetts aborted its initial plan to disclose all
claims filed,145 this data is instructive as to the misrepresentation
caused by such disclosure. If the physicians in the Bovjberg and
Petronis study were subject to the disclosure standards first issued
in Massachusetts, only 20.2% of the physicians would have escaped
publication of a claims history despite the fact that 79.4% of the phy-
sicians faced only non-consequential claims, or faced no claims at
all.146 Even if the mere filing of a claim has some consumer value, it
seems difficult to justify tarnishing a physician’s professional reputa-
tion by disclosing claims that never involved demands or expenditure
of funds by the physician’s insurer.
The study also concluded that there is predictive power in mal-
practice claims.147 Regardless of size or frequency of prior claims,
“having any baseline claims at all puts a physician at substantially
higher risk of having subsequent claims of all categories.”148 This
should not, however, alter the above conclusion that disclosure of
non-consequential claims is more harmful than helpful to the general
consumer. Non-consequential claims are not reliable indicators of
poor quality of care or poor physician-patient relationships.149 In fact,
non-consequential claims, if they have any informative value, are
only indicative of the increasing litigiousness of patients.150 Though
some advocates steadfastly believe any information is better than no
information,151 the medical field is one of such complexity that states
should proceed cautiously in allowing consumers to place value on
claims that neither the courts, nor insurers, would give credence.
The third segment of the study focused on the usefulness of prior
claims given the determined predictive power of claim history.152 In-
terestingly, this analysis never mentions the potential use of such in-
formation by patient-consumers. Rather, the study emphasized the
potential use for insurers and as a means for “quality monitoring”153
by peer review boards. There are two plausible explanations for ex-
cluding consumer interests. The first is the timing of the study. The
Bovjberg and Petronis results were published in 1994, two years
                                                                                                                   
145. See Miller, supra note 7, at 133-34; State Increases Access, supra note 2.
146. Massachusetts’ original, but not enacted, standard was the publication of any
physician with any claims history, so only 20.2% of the physicians in the Florida study
would have fit the no-claim requirement even though an additional 59.2% had claims
which fell in the non-consequential claims category. See Bovjberg & Petronis, supra note
48, at 1425.
147. See Bovjberg & Petronis, supra note 48, at 1425.
148. Id.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 7, at 133.
152. See Bovjberg & Petronis, supra note 48, at 1425.
153. Id. The study concedes that the “use of claims history [by patients] is more contro-
versial.” Id.
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prior to the onslaught of consumer-driven legislation to publish such
information. Second, the questions that seemed to be the impetus for
the study itself stemmed from the value of the National Practitioner
Data Bank,154 a source unavailable to the public at large, as a gauge
for medical quality and future problems.155
Bovjberg and Petronis concluded that claims history is a useful
tool for medical malpractice insurers as a means for experience rat-
ing potential insureds and as a basis for determining insurability.156
This is not a problematic conclusion in terms of physician profiles be-
cause the issues involved in disclosing to an insurer that will ulti-
mately provide coverage are vastly different than the issues involved
in disclosing to a consumer who has little concept of the triangular
relationship between physicians, their insurers, and patients-
consumers. The researchers ultimately concluded that:
this analysis does not address the dollar cost of reporting compli-
ance, nor does it seek to look behind the bald fact of claims out-
comes to any estimate of true merit. Claims history is not a meas-
ure of technical medical competence and is certainly no measure of
the value of a physician to society. However, it does indicate a
measurable cost—the fiscal and emotional costs of resolving the
malpractice claim. The predictive information inherent in claims,
even small claims, could be used to reduce these costs.157
The conclusions about the use of claims history to regulate the medi-
cal profession are more directly related to the issues, especially the
accountability issues, raised by provider-specific data disclosure leg-
islation.158 As suggested above, prior claims predict health-care-
related costs which, as with all products, will eventually be passed on
to the health care consumer.159 Publication, however, is not the best
means for reducing or eliminating these costs. Better regulation
within the profession and changes in the legal approach to malprac-
tice claims would be more effective, as they would treat the problem
at the source.
C.   Licensing Board and Hospital Disciplinary Actions
The third category of information the Massachusetts Advisory
Committee deemed appropriate for profile disclosure is disciplinary
actions against physicians.160 As opposed to the above discussion in
which prior malpractice claims histories were analyzed as indicators
                                                                                                                   
154. See discussion infra Part V.C.1.
155. See generally Blaner, supra note 94.
156. See Bovjberg & Petronis, supra note 48, at 1425.
157. Id. at 1426.
158. See supra Part III.
159. See Bovjberg & Petronis, supra note 48, at 1426.
160. See Miller, supra note 7, at 131; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 5 (1997).
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of potential problems that could eventually lead to medical board ac-
tion, the types of data disclosed within this category are final deci-
sions that affect a physician’s ability to practice. While some believe
prior claims can be used to forewarn consumers that a physician may
not deliver the quality of care desired,161 board action would seem to
be the most valuable type of information available. After all, discipli-
nary action is usually administered by a physician’s peers,162 indi-
viduals with the specialized knowledge of the practices and proce-
dures within a given field. Malpractice claims, however, involve pa-
tients, insurers, lawyers, and jurors who are likely to know nothing
about medicine but are nonetheless placed in a position to evaluate a
physician’s behavior. Certainly, if one believes prior claims history is
valuable to the consumer, disciplinary action would be invaluable in
physician selection.
As with claims histories, however, the disclosure of licensing
board and hospital disciplinary action is wrought with problems. Dis-
closure of licensing board decisions, which are generally a matter of
public record, is not as problematic as is the process by which such
discipline is handed down.163 The public attention in Massachusetts,
which spawned the legislative drive to publish information164 in an
effort to make peer reviews more accountable, certainly suggests
that, if anything, licensing boards are too lenient.
1.   Regulation and the National Practitioner Data Bank
Some background on the National Practitioner Data Bank
(NPDB) is helpful in understanding the role of provider data in
                                                                                                                   
161. See Miller, supra note 7, at 127.
162. For example, in Florida, the Board of Medicine, which serves as “the state agency
responsible for protecting Florida consumers from incompetent, dangerous and predatory
doctors,” has 15 seats, 12 of which are held by physicians. Judd, supra note 83, at A1.
163. Among the most disturbing factors in the administration of discipline is the length
and seemingly inconsistent treatment of cases. For instance, of the cases before the Florida
Board of Medicine that closed in 1996, the average time that elapsed from the filing of a
consumer complaint to final resolution by the Board was 27.1 months. See id.
The resolution of a disciplinary complaint is a three-step process in Florida. When a
complaint is lodged against a physician, the complaint is reviewed by the AHCA to deter-
mine whether the allegations, if proven, amount to an actionable violation of the standard
of care within the state. Of the 1996 closed cases, this first step took 6.4 months. See Judd,
supra note 93, at B1.
Probable cause review is the second step. Cases alleging inadequate care are turned over
to medical experts for review. Those cases involving substandard care and cases involving
physician misconduct are then reviewed by a probable cause panel charged with deter-
mining whether formal charges should be brought against a physician. This phase took an
average of 9.5 months. See id.
If the probable cause panel finds a violation, the AHCA files formal charges against the
physician. The Board of Medicine then takes the case and makes a final determination of
disciplinary action against the physician. This step averaged 11.2 months. See id.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 101-13.
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“quality monitoring” or professional regulation of physicians.165 The
NPDB is the product of the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of
1986 (HCQIA),166 federal legislation that sought to insulate peer re-
view from legal intrusions.167 The NPDB was created as a repository
for three types of information, one of which was paid malpractice
claims. To fulfill the goal of the HCQIA, the data in the NPDB “are
only available to bolster peer review and the actions of licensing
boards; allowance of discovery in subsequent malpractice cases was
eliminated by amendment, and data are not available to the pub-
lic.”168 HCQIA specifically admonishes peer reviewers accessing the
information that malpractice payments should not raise even a pre-
sumption that malpractice occurred simply because a claim was
filed.169 If such cautious language is necessary to remind a physi-
cian’s own peers that claims do not necessarily correlate with a
breach of the standard of care or even undesirable quality of care, it
would seem that a consumer without the specialized medical and le-
gal knowledge would be less capable of fully appreciating the signifi-
cance of such a history. Accordingly, the disclaimers aimed at con-
sumers by both Massachusetts170 and Florida171 in their public pro-
files closely parallel the language of the HCQIA.172
                                                                                                                   
165. See  Bovjberg & Petronis, supra note 48, at 1425.
166. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (1994); see also Thomas, supra note 45, at 563-64. The
NPDB faced opposition similar to that faced by state compiled profiles, which was the con-
cern of Congress, and which resulted in the HCQIA “‘weeding out incompetent and unpro-
fessional physicians who change their practice locations after losing privileges at hospitals
where the offending conduct occurred.’” Id. at 564 (citation omitted). The medical commu-
nity, via the American Medical Association, despite opposing the NPDB, lobbied for the
HCQIA on the premise “‘that a national system of malpractice payment reporting would
create a huge amount of complex and misleading information. They cited the variability in
payments based on nuisance value, costs of litigation, specialty, jury sympathy to plain-
tiffs, and other factors.’” Id. (citation omitted); see also Margolis, supra note 23, at 25
(“While the general public regarded the Data Bank as a positive initiative, it was initially
viewed by health care professionals with near-panic, because they feared that its existence
would encourage an onslaught of frivolous malpractice litigation against competent practi-
tioners.”)
167. See Thomas, supra note 45, at 563-64.
168. Bovjberg & Petronis, supra note 48, at 1425.
169. See id.
170. VI. Malpractice Information
Some studies have shown that there is no significant correlation between mal-
practice history and a doctor’s competence. At the same time, the Board be-
lieves that consumers should have access to malpractice information. In these
profiles, the Board has given you information about both the malpractice his-
tory of the physician’s specialty and the physician’s history of payments. The
Board has placed payment amounts into three statistical categories: below av-
erage, average, and above average. To make the best health care decisions, you
should view this information in perspective. You could miss an opportunity for
high quality care by selecting a doctor based solely on malpractice history.
When considering malpractice data, please keep in mind:
* Malpractice histories tend to vary by specialty. Some specialties are more
likely than others to be the subject of litigation. This report compares doctors
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Another example from Florida helps illustrate problems that may
arise with the Massachusetts legislation. One study of Florida obste-
tricians (Entman study) with malpractice claims histories examined
the usefulness of “‘bad-apple’ monitoring systems such as the
NPDB”173 in identifying physicians at risk for future errors in their
medical practice.174 The Entman study concluded that using such
data as a professional monitoring device “may be misjudging the
likelihood that substandard clinical care will be provided by physi-
cians with prior claims”175 and that despite the public interest aims of
the NPDB, “this study suggests its data may not reliably identify
physicians likely to make errors.”176 The Entman study tested the
hypothesis that peer review of current practice can distinguish be-
tween physicians based on their prior claims.177 Using three types of
tests, researchers were unable to link prior claims experience with
                                                                                                                   
only to the members of their specialty, not to all doctors, in order to make indi-
vidual doctor’s history more meaningful.
* This report reflects data for the last 10 years of a doctor’s practice. For doc-
tors practicing less than 10 years, the data covers their total years of practice.
You should take into account how long the doctor has been in practice when
considering malpractice averages.
* The incident causing the malpractice claim may have happened years before
a payment is finally made. Sometimes, it takes a long time for a malpractice
lawsuit to move through the legal system.
* Some doctors work primarily with high risk patients. These doctors may have
malpractice histories that are higher than average because they specialize in
cases or patients who are at very high risk for problems.
* Settlement of a claim may occur for a variety of reasons which do not neces-
sarily reflect negatively on the professional competence or conduct of the physi-
cian. A payment in settlement of a medical malpractice action or claim should
not be construed as creating a presumption that medical malpractice has oc-
curred.
You may wish to discuss information provided in this report, and malpractice
generally, with your doctor. The Board can refer you to other articles on this
subject.
Massachusetts Board of Registration, supra note 108.
171. See FLA. STAT. § 455.5651(4) (1997).
If information relating to a liability action is included in a practitioner’s practi-
tioner profile, the profile must also include the following statement: “Settle-
ment of a claim may occur for a variety of reasons that do not necessarily re-
flect negatively on the professional competence or conduct of the physician. A
payment in settlement of a medical malpractice action or claim should not be
construed as creating a presumption that medical malpractice has occurred.”
Id.
172. See 42 U.S.C. § 11137(d) (1994) (“In interpreting information reported under this
subchapter, a payment in settlement of a medical malpractice action or claim shall not be
construed as creating a presumption that medical malpractice has occurred.”)
173. Entman et al., supra note 35, at 1590. The study was commissioned to investigate
the link between prior malpractice claims and future claims. The study focused on obste-
tricians practicing between 1977 and 1983 in Florida, a particularly litigious state. See id.
174. See id.
175. Id. at 1588.
176. Id. at 1591.
177. See id. at 1588.
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the technical quality of care or current practice of the Florida physi-
cians when reviewers were unaware of the prior history.178
2.   The Florida Example
It does not take more than one week of practice in a law firm spe-
cializing in medical malpractice defense in the state of Florida to rec-
ognize the inequity of disciplinary action administered by the state
agency charged with regulating the medical profession. The Florida
Report on Physician Discipline and Malpractice, published by the
Agency for Health Care Administration in April 1997,179 has four sec-
tions: physician discipline,180 administrative complaints,181 emergency
actions,182 and closed medical malpractice claims.183 While it would be
hard to argue that accurate information in each of these categories
can be anything but helpful in the move toward improving health
care, allowing health care consumers to make better choices, and im-
proving the review systems already in place, the fact remains that
much of the information available is incomplete and misleading. Sec-
tions one through three of the Report disclose disciplinary action in
uniform language that describes in legal terms the alleged viola-
tion.184 As the Report admits, however, two physicians found guilty of
very different violations may have the same description under the
“Terms of Final Order” section of the Report.185
If the goal of physician profiles is to adequately inform consumers
of their potential physician choices by listing generic charges and
resolutions, including instances in which the physician neither ad-
                                                                                                                   
178. See id.
179. See FLORIDA HEALTH CARE REPORT, supra note 40, at title page.
180. According to the Florida Health Care Report, disciplinary charges are “based on
Florida law, which identifies nearly 40 grounds on which a doctor can be disciplined.” Id. at
5. The Florida Board of Medicine is the oversight board for all licensing and administrative
procedures for medical doctors (similar boards exist for osteopaths, chiropractors, and den-
tists). Sanctions for violating the rules and laws regulating Florida physicians can range
from assignments of continuing education and fines to license revocation. See id. at 5-6.
181. Administrative complaints against all health care providers in Florida are inves-
tigated by the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA). Administrative complaints
are consumer complaints filed with the agency, which are only mere accusations that initi-
ate investigation. These complaints are, however, public record, making them little differ-
ent than a non-meritorious malpractice claim. The report lists recent complaints that have
resulted in disciplinary action. See id. at 6.
182. Emergency actions are responses by AHCA to consumer complaints that reveal a
physician may be an immediate threat to public health or safety. AHCA will issue an im-
mediate suspension or restriction of the physician’s license; meanwhile AHCA can proceed
with its normal investigation or discipline. The number of emergency actions tripled in
Florida from 1995 to 1996 for a total of 41 actions in 1996. See id. AHCA attributes the in-
crease to Florida’s “aggressive action against a very small number of unsafe physicians.”
Id. at 2.
183. See id. at 7.
184. See id. at 23.
185. See id.
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mits nor denies the charges, they fail this goal.186 A nutritional label
would be deficient in its purpose if it merely stated “carbohydrates-
yes, sugars-yes, caffeine-no.” Similarly, a physician profile that
merely sketches the charges against a physician may sufficiently de-
ter a consumer but the reality may be that the physician opted to pay
a fine or submitted to continuing education rather than undergo fur-
ther review by the Board.187
One particular case found in the emergency actions section poign-
antly highlights the void of information provided by the summaries
used in the Report. The Report lists Dr. Ernesto Pinzon-Reyes as re-
ceiving “[e]mergency suspension of license based upon a finding of
committing gross malpractice.”188 This action was taken in October
1996.189 On June 26, 1997, a jury acquitted Dr. Pinzon-Reyes of first-
degree murder charges based on the very same set of facts that gave
rise to the emergency action.190 The acquittal did not prevent the
Board from proceeding with disciplinary action. In fact, six months
after he was acquitted, the Board of Medicine convened and voted 7-6
to allow Dr. Pinzon-Reyes to resume the practice of medicine.191 In
the next edition of the Report, Dr. Pinzon-Reyes will find himself
listed in section one, which lists those physicians who have been dis-
ciplined by the board.
This excerpt does illustrate what little information is really con-
veyed in this publication. The point is not that information is bad—
the point is that incomplete or misleading information is bad. Con-
sumers are not the only concern; physicians have reputational inter-
ests that need to be preserved. If physicians know they will be mis-
represented by incomplete data, the possibility exists that doctors
who practice in high-risk specialties or who take on high-risk pa-
tients will either suffer from the disclosures or will withdraw from
those practices.192 Medicine is a field in which experimentation is
sometimes the only option, and new procedures and technologies are
necessary for progress.
                                                                                                                   
186. See e.g., id. at 153-60 (listing, in chart form, the names of physicians who have
complaints filed against them and the violations the physicians allegedly committed).
187. See id., at 1-24; Judd, supra note 83, at A1; Alan Judd, Disciplining Doctors: Se-
crecy Shrouds Doctor’s Case, LAKELAND LEDGER, July 7, 1997, at A1; Judd, supra note 93,
at B1.
188. FLORIDA HEALTH CARE REPORT, supra note 42, at 165.
189. See id.
190. See State v. Pinzon Reyes, No. CF 96-00666A-XX, (Fla. 10th Cir. Ct. 1997) (dispo-
sition memorandum).
191. See Paulo Lima, Doctor Wins Back License, TAMPA TRIB., Dec. 7, 1997, at 1.  The
Board found Dr. Pinzon-Reyes guilty of records violations and voted to suspend his license
for two years with credit for time served and a “stay” for the remaining 10 months of the
suspension. He was permitted to see patients again as soon as the Board’s decision was of-
ficially filed. Dr. Pinzon-Reyes was also required to perform 100 hours of community serv-
ice.
192. See Sharrott, supra note 8, at 94-95.
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3.   Hospital Discipline—Disclosure as a Cure All?
At the time the Committee was determining what information
should be disclosed in physician profiles, a statute in Massachusetts
required hospital disciplinary reviews and actions to remain essen-
tially confidential.193 The law protecting such information was im-
plemented in an effort to insulate reviews and to encourage “full and
frank” interaction.194 The Committee analyzed the effectiveness of
the confidentiality law and determined that it had not increased the
effectiveness of intra-hospital discipline as expected.195
Relying on a 1995 report by the Inspector General of the U.S. De-
partment of Health and Human Services, the Committee determined
that a significant discrepancy existed between hospital-levied disci-
plinary action and state licensing board action.196 Nationwide, only
one out of every eight actions taken by a state board also resulted in
hospital discipline that was reported to the NPDB.197 The Committee
decided the confidentiality of hospital actions failed to stimulate bet-
ter peer review within the hospital setting, and thus patients should
have access to information regarding hospital sanctions.198
D.   Criminal Convictions
The final category of information approved by the Massachusetts
Advisory Committee for profile disclosure was convictions for felonies
or misdemeanors.199 Such convictions are already a matter of public
record and would seem to stand little chance of misinterpretation.
The only anti-disclosure argument that can seriously be proffered for
convictions is that certain crimes may not be relevant to medical
practice or to a physician’s fitness to treat patients. This argument is
generally a weak defense because all crimes derogate public order
and the law. While publication may be damning, the physician-
patient relationship is significantly based on trust.200 Convicted phy-
sicians had their day in court and most likely were convicted by lay
persons similarly situated to the consumers that may use physician
                                                                                                                   
193. See MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 111, § § 111, 204 (1995); see also Miller, supra note 7, at
131. The Board of Registration in Medicine was allowed access to hospital disciplinary ac-
tions for use in the Board’s own proceedings against physicians. The current law deems fi-
nal disciplinary proceedings against physicians to be public record. See MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 112, § 5(d) (1997).
194. See id.
195. See Miller, supra note 7, at 131.
196. See id.
197. See id. Hospitals are required by statute to report any adverse decisions to the
NPDB. During the first three and one-quarter years of NPDB operation, only 25% of the
nation’s hospitals made reports to the Data Bank.
198. See id. at 131-32.
199. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 5(a) (1997).
200. See Miller, supra note 7, at 126.
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profiles. Certainly, if a jury analyzed the facts of the crime and found
the physician guilty, a consumer may be similarly inclined to doubt
the willingness of a provider to stay within the bounds when prac-
ticing medicine.
E.   What Is Not in the Massachusetts Profiles and Why
Several types of information failed to pass Committee scrutiny,
ironically for many of the same reasons articulated above. Malprac-
tice claims201 and criminal charges prior to final resolution are ex-
cluded because the
informational value [they] might carry is far outweighed by con-
siderations of fairness to the accused doctor. Indeed, a patient up-
set about an unavoidably bad medical result might be irrationally
driven to file a malpractice claim, or to press a criminal charge,
with no factual justification or realistic hope of success.202
The Committee also recognized that claims without final resolution
are unreliable indicators of physician quality and character.203
Physician confidentiality interests outweighed consumer interests
on the issue of substance dependency, as long as the addicted physi-
cian participates in a Board of Medicine approved treatment pro-
gram.204 The Committee juxtaposed a physician’s dependency with
any other patient’s right to have confidential medical records, and
concluded that physicians’ rights as patients eclipse consumer pro-
tection.205
Finally, provider-specific outcome data failed to make the final cut
for profile disclosure in Massachusetts,206 though New York207 and
Pennsylvania208 found certain outcome data valuable for purposes of
consumer evaluation. The Committee’s reluctance to undertake de-
velopment of an outcome database reflected its concern over when
the “current outcomes measures convey sufficiently reliable informa-
tion about the quality of physician performance to warrant recom-
mending their collection by the Board or their release to the public on
physician profiles.”209 This laudable concern was, perhaps, not prop-
erly considered when the Massachusetts Advisory Committee—as
                                                                                                                   
201. See supra Part V.B..
202. Miller, supra note 7, at 134.
203. See id.
204. See id.
205. See id.
206. See id. at 135.
207. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2804-b (c)(i) (McKinney 1997); see also Miller, supra
note 7, at 134.
208. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3214 (a)–(i) (1997); see also Miller, supra note 7, at 134.
209. Miller, supra note 7, at 135.
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well as the legislatures and agencies of several of the states210—con-
templated consumer-oriented physician profiles.
V.   WHAT DOES LEGISLATION LIKE THIS COST?
Several states have Internet access to physician data.211 Others
operate toll-free phone lines,212 provide copy and facsimile service for
requesting consumers,213 and generate entire publications214 of all in-
trastate data. Providing such information involves the staffing of
phone lines, integration of information systems, and extensive cleri-
cal and publishing expenses. Compilation and integration of the in-
formation, and especially verification, add to the expense of profiles.
These are superfluous expenditures to make data that is, for the
most part, already public and available somewhere to a patient truly
interested in discovering it.
In preparation for the most recent Florida measure to increase
consumer access to physician data, the Florida Senate prepared a
Staff Analysis and Economic Impact Statement for Senate Bill 948,
Physician Profiles.215 Operation and staff expenses for the toll-free
hotline will result in costs of $250,185 per year.216 The legislation
would require AHCA to modify investigatory and referral mecha-
nisms with anticipated costs totaling $5,619,700 for 1997-98 and
$6,872,669 for 1998-99 based on 18,000 provider complaints per
year.217 The Department of Health is anticipated to incur total costs
to implement the legislation of $1,680,396 for the 1997-99 period.218
                                                                                                                   
210. See State Increases Access, supra note 2.
211. Massachusetts and Arizona currently provide Internet access. See Massachusetts
Board of Registration in Medicine (visited Apr. 2, 1998) <http://www.docboard.org/ma/ma_
home.htm>; Arizona State Board of Medical Examiners (visited Apr. 2, 1998) <http://www.
docboard.org/az/df/azsearch.htm>. Florida temporarily had a site, and the Brown-Waite
legislation calls for a permanent one by 1999.
212. See State Increases Access, supra note 2.
213. See id.
214. For example, Florida’s Report on Physician Discipline and Malpractice is a 194-
page publication available for $10 via mail.
215. See Fla. S. Comm. on Health Care, SB 948 (1997) Staff Analysis (Mar. 18, 1997)
(on file with comm.).
216. See id. at 13. These expenses are calculated for fiscal years 1997-98 and 1998-99.
217. See id. at 14. Expenses for fiscal year 1997-98 are broken down as follows: non-
recurring costs of $465,198, salaries and benefits of $2,500,422 for 89 full-time employees,
and expenses of $2,654,080. The 1998-99 expenses are anticipated as follows: salaries and
benefits of $3,333,896, and expenses of $3,538,773.
218. See id. The “fiscal impact” for 1997-99 consists of $754,826 in costs for data verifi-
cation, $489,173 in costs for data entry, $436,397 in expenses (including project analysts)
to make the profiles accessible via the Internet. Data verification will require 17 OPS staff
positions and five and one-half full-time staff positions. Data entry will require 32 OPS
staff positions and two full-time positions.
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VI.   CONCLUSION
It is said that knowledge is power. Certainly, there are tremen-
dous benefits in knowing more about those who provide health care.
Consent can be enhanced and providers can be held more account-
able, and hopefully the quality of health can be increased. Disclosing
data does not, however, automatically impart on those who read it
the ability to properly apply the information to positive ends. Infor-
mation about malpractice and the discipline of physicians needs to be
carefully presented to benefit the consumer without inadvertently
damaging the physician. Ranking and scaling the severity of injuries
or misconduct fail in this regard. A simple indication that there in-
deed has been a malpractice claim or disciplinary action, and pro-
viding references so that the interested consumer can find thorough
information on a given physician, are the best means of informing
consumers without causing unnecessary harm.
Health care is a dynamic and rapidly evolving sector of society
that receives a tremendous amount of attention. There is a need to
enhance the information available; however, the recent disclosure
legislation is a leap by lawmakers without an adequate foundation.
Better agency regulation and more thorough and consistent profes-
sional standards need to be implemented to ensure positive growth in
medicine. This is, after all, the information age. The information pro-
vided should be the most accurate and comprehensive available, not
mere tidbits of data that may lead to greater apprehension and ten-
sion among the plethora of health care players.
